Section 8 Anti Terrorism Act (ATA),1997

Section 8: Prohibition of acts intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred

2023 YLR 564 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

MUHAMMAD IFTIKHAR VS State

2023 YLR 564 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

MUHAMMAD IFTIKHAR VS State

Ss. 8, 9, 11-F(5), 11-H, 11-N, 11-I & 11-J—Prohibition of acts intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred, membership, support and meetings relating to a proscribed organization, funding arrangements—Fund raising—Appreciation of evidence—Benefit of doubt—Accused was charged for collecting money for the banned organization being its active member—Admittedly, no specific evidence, either oral or documentary, had been placed, proved or relied on record which could show that the accused was member of the banned organization or had any proximate or otherwise nexus with that organization—Just because a handful of police official of CTD had given a tag of member of banned organization to the accused, that did not become a conclusive proof of accused being member of banned organization—No evidence to show that the accused did act of the nature—More serious the offence alleged, higher shall be the quality of evidence required to convict the accused—Appreciating the evidence brought by the prosecution, it was found that neither in the depositions of either of the four witnesses nor in the form of any documentary evidence, it had come on record that the accused was indulging in terrorism or was part of any such activity—Admittedly, accused had not any terror or criminal history of any sort and he had absolutely clean antecedents—Case of prosecution was not that the accused was directly or indirectly involved in any terrorist act prior to his apprehension in the case—In such circumstances it was abundant duty of the prosecution to collect legally admissible evidence to show that the accused was member of banned/ proscribed organization—Prosecution had not been able to bring on record any evidence qua commission of offence punishable under Ss. 11-H, 11-I & 11-J of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Circumstances established that the prosecution had not been able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond shadow of doubt through unimpeachable evidence—Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

2023 YLR 564 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

MUHAMMAD IFTIKHAR VS State

Ss. 8, 9, 11-F(5), 11-H, 11-N, 11-I & 11-J—Prohibition of acts intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred, membership, support and meetings relating to a proscribed organization, funding arrangements—Fund raising—Appreciation of evidence—Benefit of doubt—Decoy witness—Scope—Accused was charged for collecting money for the banned organization being its active member—Decoy witness arranged by complainant could not be said to be a fully independent witness—Witness who paid tainted money to the accused and received receipt and a book became decoy witness—Witness arranged by the police preparatory to trap the accused could not be treated equally by the court with the eye-witness—Even complainant had not deployed shadow witness to hear the conversation between the decoy witness and the accused—Decoy witness had not stated as to how he identified the accused—Complainant and decoy witness had not stated that the description of the accused was given by the secret informer to them or they already knew the accused—Investigating Officer had not collected any material revealing that the accused was distributing any written material nor as to how many books were printed and paid for by the accused—From the prosecution evidence it revealed that book was recovered from the black bag of the accused—Whereas, the book received by decoy witness from the accused and handed over by him to complainant was not produced before the court—As only one book recovered from the bag of the accused was produced before the court—Investigating Officer had not collected any material to establish that the accused distributed book to any other person or persons in any manner whatsoever—Circumstances established that the prosecution had not been able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond shadow of doubt through unimpeachable evidence—Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

2023 YLR 564 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

MUHAMMAD IFTIKHAR VS State

2020 MLD 1248 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

SHAHID HUSSAIN VS State

Ss. 9, 8, 11-F, 11-W &19-A—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 103—Prohibition of acts likely to stir up sectarian hatred, membership, support and meetings relating to a proscribed organization—Mode of making searches and arrest—Search to be made in presence of witnesses—Appreciation of evidence—Police witnesses—Scope—Complainant, an Inspector of police, complained that people of different sects came to him and complained about the spite being spread by the accused through facebook—Investigating officer deposed that the accused during investigation had disclosed the password of his facebook account and the account was checked by an Incharge of the IT department who had found the spiteful conversations—Witnesses had remained consistent on all material points—Accused had cross-examined them at length but had failed to impeach their credibility—Police witnesses were as good as any other witness unless it was proved through reliable evidence that they had a reason to falsely implicate the accused—No such material was brought on record in the case—Section 19-A, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, excluded the application of S.103, Cr.P.C.—Investigating Officer had sent the USB (Universal Serial Bus) flash drive and the CPU (Central Processing Unit) to the Forensic Laboratory—Report of Forensic Laboratory had reinforced the prosecution case—Prosecution had proved the charge against the accused beyond any shadow of doubt—High Court, while dismissing appeal, reduced the sentence handed down by the Trial Court as the accused was a first offender.

2020 PCrLJN 156 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

ABDUL JABBAR VS State

Ss. 9 & 8—Prohibition of acts intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred—Appreciation of evidence—Benefit of doubt—Case property—Safe custody— Tampering with case property—Contradictory statements—Scope— Complainant, a Sub-Inspector of police, complained that he received a report that the accused, who ran a mobile shop, was spreading hate and jehadi material among the public—Complainant testified that he seized several articles from the shop of accused vide recovery memo but he was completely silent about what he did with them—Statement of Investigating Officer admitting receipt of case property from complainant was insufficient to provide the missing link and complete the chain of custody, as the complainant had not said so—Investigating Officer deposed that he raided the shop of accused for investigation at 9:45 a.m.; that he returned to the Headquarters at about 12:00 noon/1:00 p.m. and that he had sealed the CPU (Central Processing Unit) at the site—Report of Forensic Laboratory revealed that the operating system of the CPU was last logged on at 5:47:29 p.m., which clearly indicated tampering with the CPU after its seizure—Prosecution had not brought any evidence on record to prove that the accused had a criminal history or was a member of any proscribed organization or was otherwise supporting or promoting the cause of any such body—Heavy onus rested on the prosecution to explain as to what motivated the accused to possess and disseminate the hate and jehadi material—Prosecution evidence was not free from doubt—Appeal against conviction was allowed, in circumstances.

2019 PCrLJ 1432 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT

MUJAHID IQBAL VS State

Ss. 4 & 14—Anti Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7 & 8—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 148 & 149—Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S. 17(2)(3)(4)—Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting armed with deadly weapon, unlawful assembly, haraabah, act of terrorism—Police custody of accused was declined on the ground that since the accused was juvenile at the time of commission of offence, therefore, Anti-Terrorism Court lacked jurisdiction to hold his trial—Police was directed that the case be forwarded to Juvenile Court—Scope—Under S. 4(3) of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, the Juvenile Court established under the Ordinance had exclusive jurisdiction to try cases in which a juvenile was accused of commission of offence—Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was promulgated on 20th August 1997, much prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance—According to S. 21-G of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, initially all offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were to be tried by the Anti-Terrorism Courts established under the Act—Word “exclusively” inserted in S. 21-G of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 being later in time, would have precedence over S. 4(3) of the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, when the intention of legislature was reflected in S. 14 of the Ordinance which envisaged that the provisions of the Ordinance would be in addition to and not in derogation of any law for the time being in force—Even otherwise, the Federal Government of Pakistan through Notification dated 30.05.2012 had declared all the Anti-Terrorism Courts established throughout the country under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, competent to exercise the powers of Juvenile Courts in the area of their respective jurisdiction, under the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000—Not only the powers and functions of Juvenile Court had been conferred on the Anti-Terrorism Court, but under S. 21-G of the Act, Anti-Terrorism Court had exclusive jurisdiction to try all such offences—Revision petition was accepted by setting aside the impugned order.

2019 PLD 527 ISLAMABAD

MUHAMMAD SIKANDAR VS State

Ss. 6, 7, 8 & 25—Act of terrorism—Appreciation of evidence—Causing terror—Proof—Accused was convicted and sentenced in committing acts of terrorism by using his family as human shields while deadlocking main road in federal capital armed with automatic weapons and ammunition—Accused assailed conviction and sentence passed by Trial Court on grounds that his actions did not constitute terrorism—Validity—Offence of terrorism was constituted as design was to create psychological impact of creating a sense of fear and insecurity relatable to general public, society or a section thereof—Offences mentioned in schedule must have nexus with object of statute and contemplated under Ss.6 to 8 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—For offence of terrorism to be constituted it was not necessary that victims were actually harmed or that terror was caused; it was sufficient if design of intended act was likely to create terror, a sense of fear and insecurity amongst general public, society or section thereof—Mens rea and actus reus contemplated in Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 coexisted, in the present case—High Court declined to interfere in conviction and sentence awarded by Trial Court as prosecution had proved charge against accused beyond reasonable doubt and that there were no mitigating circumstances for handing down a lesser sentence—Appeal was dismissed in circumstances.

2017 PCrLJ 505 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT

SHAH SIM KHAN VS State

Ss. 6, 7 & 8—Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act (XXIII of 2013), Ss. 15 & 17—Possession of un-licensed manufacture, sale or repair of arms and ammunition, unauthorized transportation of arms and ammunition, unlicensed possession of arms and ammunition terrorism— Appreciation of evidence— “Terrorism”—Essential ingredients—Complainant (police) alleged that they received information about transportation of a huge lot of arms and ammunitions by a car which was apprehended and recovery of ammunition was made from its secret cavities—Effect—Mere recovery of huge quantity of ammunition without producing the cogent and concrete evidence showing that accused belonged to a terrorist organization would not saddle accused for commission of an offence attracting “terrorism”—Ingredients for determination of offence of terrorism were first taking of action specified in S. 6(2) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, second action committed with design, intention and mens rea and third causing intimidation, awe, fear and insecurity in the public or society—All such ingredients were not attracted to the facts and circumstances of present case—Prosecution had based its opinion with regard to use of ammunition for the purpose of terrorist activities merely on assumption and presumption which in the given circumstances could not be acceded to—Appeal was allowed and case was remanded accordingly for decision afresh.

2017 PLD 55 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT

AKHTAR MUHAMMAD VS State

365-A—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 2(t), 6, 7(e), 8, 13, 17 & Third Schedule—Kidnapping or abducting for extortion of property, valuable security, etc., act of Terrorism—Appreciation of evidence—Jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court—Scope—Question before High Court was as to whether the offence under S. 365-A, P.P.C., if having no nexus with the object of Ss. 6, 7 and 8 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, would still be triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court or an ordinary court—Under S.2(t) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, ‘Scheduled Offence’ meant an offence as set out in the Third Schedule of the Act—Abduction or kidnapping for ransom had been inserted in the Third Schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997; therefore, S. 365-A, P.P.C. was a Scheduled Offence, which was similar to offence under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, punishment of which had been provided under S. 7(e) of the Act—Both offences were identical except that the quantum of punishment of both the offences slightly varied from each other—Punishment provided under S. 7(e) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for the offence of kidnapping for ransom or hostage taking was death or imprisonment for life—Abduction or kidnapping for ransom had been added in the Third Schedule to Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, but punishment thereof had not been provided therein; rather, the punishment had been provided under S. 365-A, P.P.C., that was death or imprisonment for life and forfeiture of property—Forfeiture of property, in addition to death or imprisonment for life under S. 365-A, P.P.C., was the point of variation in the sentences to the two offences; therefore, the accused was to be charged under S. 7(e) of the Act and under S. 365-A, P.P.C. separately—In case of proof of the charge of abduction for ransom, if the offences had nexus with the object of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the accused would be convicted under S.7(e) of the Act, otherwise under S. 365-A, P.P.C.; however, at the same time, the accused would not be convicted under both the offences—All offences with regard to use or threat of actions under S.6 of the Act, and offences mentioned under the Third Schedule, would be exclusively triable by Anti-Terrorism Court along with offences with which the accused might be charged under the Code (P.P.C.) at the same trial, as provided under S.17 of the Act—Anti-Terrorism Court could also try other offences with which an accused might under the Code be charged at the same trial if the offence was connected with such other offence—If accused was charged under S. 7(a) of the Act and under S. 302, P.P.C., then he would be separately charge sheeted under S.7(a) of the Act and under S. 302, P.P.C., and on proof of the charges, the accused could be convicted and sentenced under each of the two sections of the laws, as one related to special law while the other related to ordinary law—However, in case of an offence under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and scheduled offence, the accused though would be charge sheeted separately, but he would be convicted under only one offence keeping in view the proof available on the record—Words ‘under this Act’ used in S. 13 of Anti-Terrorism Act clarified trial of the cases under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and the words ‘of scheduled offences’ spoke about the trial of scheduled offence as according to S. 2(t) of the Act, ‘Scheduled Offence’ meant an offence as set out in the Third Schedule—Offences mentioned in the Third Schedule, even having no nexus with the object or terrorism, would be exclusively triable by Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and not by an ordinary court.

2016 YLRN 122 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

MUHAMMAD IRFAN VS State

Ss. 6, 7 & 8—Act of terrorism, determining factors of—Whether a particular act was an act of terrorism or not, the purpose, the motivation, the actus reus or mens rea, were the determining factors to resolve the said riddle—Mere brutality of an offence, in absence of the requirement of S.6 would not constitute an offence under S.7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Where element of sense of fear or insecurity in public or a section of the public was missing, the heinousness alone could not render a case triable under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Offences committed in the background of personal enmity or with the burning desire of settling private vendetta, resulting in fear to many or a few, certainly, would not fall within the domain of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Fear of insecurity in the society, as a fallout or undesigned consequences, was not by itself terrorism, unless the motive or the design or the mens rea pre-existed for creating such fear or insecurity in the society—Fear or insecurity, must not be a byproduct, fallout or unintended consequence of a private crime, and that was what to be understood, while determining, if a crime/offence committed, could be held an act of terrorism or not—Creation of fear and insecurity in the society was not itself terrorism, unless it was coupled with the motive; it was essential that the offence committed, must have a nexus with the object of the case as contemplated under Ss. 6, 7 & 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Trial Court, in the present case, did not appear to have taken regard to the nexus between the offence committed and the object of the case as envisaged by Ss.6, 7 & 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Mere allegation that accused used acid for causing bodily injuries to prosecution witnesses, would not give rise to an act of terrorism—Conviction/sentence recorded by the Trial Court against accused under S.7(c) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was set aside and he was acquitted of the charge in circumstances.

2016 PCrLJ 961 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

MUHRAM ALI VS State

Ss. 23, 8, 7 & 6(k)—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 148 & 149—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 561-A—Qatl-i-amd; abetment; common object; terrorism—Power to transfer cases to regular courts—Application under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.—Complainants alleged that the accused persons demanded Bhatta from them, and on their refusal to pay the same, the accused attacked on them with firearms making straight and aerial firing, which had resulted in killing of the deceased—Anti-Terrorism Court dismissed application for transfer of the case to ordinary court—Validity—Undeniably, the parties were on inimical terms with each other, as factum of animosity was reflected form the series of FIR’s lodged by them—Government had issued notification, whereby reward money for dangerous criminals had been notified and the name of the deceased was mentioned therein—Said notification had also mentioned the personal character and criminal activities of the deceased—Neither the deceased had challenged said notification, nor the same had been recalled by the Home Department—Averments of the FIR were silent regarding financial status and source of income of the complainant against which the accused had been demanding Bhatta—Complainant had also not disclosed the specific dates, time and places of demanding of Bhatta by the accused person, nor any such evidence had been produced before the Investigating Officer to prima facie establish such allegations—Mere allegations of demanding Bhatta, in absence of any tangible material, did not attract S. 6(k) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Section 6(k) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was neither mentioned in the FIR nor in the Challan—Anti-Terrorism Court had taken cognizance of the case while declining request of the Investigating Officer to transfer the case to the ordinary court—Cumulative effect of the averments of FIR, surrounding circumstances and other material available on record, had replicated that the offence had been committed on account of previous enmity with a definite motive—Alleged place of occurrence was not populated area, and consequently, the allegations of aerial firing did not appear to be a case of terrorism—Intention of the accused party did not depict or manifest any act of terrorism—Loss of life existed in a murder case, which was also heinous crime against the society, but trial of each murder case could not be adjudged by the Anti-Terrorism Court, except where peculiar circumstances as contemplated under Ss.6, 7, 8 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 existed—High Court, allowing application under S. 23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, directed the Anti-Terrorism Court to transmit the case to the Sessions Judge—Application under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C was allowed accordingly.

2015 YLR 2617 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

MIRCHOO alias MIRCH VS State

Ss. 6, 7, 8 & 23—Object and scope of Ss.6, 7 & 8 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—“Act of terrorism”, determination of—Principles—Case triable by Anti-terrorism court—Ingredients—In order to determine as to whether an offence would fall within the ambit of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it was essential to have a glance over the allegations made in the FIR; material collected during investigation and surrounding circumstances and to examine; whether the ingredient of alleged offence had any nexus with the object of the case as contemplated under Ss.6, 7, 8 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997; whether a particular act was an act of terrorism or not, the motivation, object, design and purpose behind the said act was to be seen; whether said act had created a sense of fear and insecurity in the public, or in a section of the public or community, or in any sect; whether action resulted in striking terror or creating fear, panic, sensation, helplessness; and sense of insecurity among the people in the particular area, the same would amount to terror and such an action would fall within the ambit of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and would be triable by a Special Court constituted for such purpose—Courts had only to see, whether the ‘terrorist act’ was such which would have the tendency to create sense of fear and insecurity in the minds of the people or any section of the society—In the present case, accused person had committed offence on the main road and target was Sub-Inspector of Police was not material that Police functionary was on duty or not at the time of violation—In the result of indiscriminate firing by automatic weapons two persons had lost their lives—Act of accused on main road in brutal manner, had created fear and insecurity to the general public—Act of accused involved serious violence against the members of the Police force—Case, in circumstances, prima facie fell under S.6(n) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and Anti-Terrorism Court had the exclusive jurisdiction to try the same—Application of accused, to transfer case to regular court, was dismissed, in circumstances.

2015 PCrLJ 628 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

SHAHID ZAFAR VS State

Ss. 6, 7 & 8—“Terrorist act”, determination of—Jurisdiction of Special Court—For determination as to whether an offence would fall within the ambit of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it would be essential to have a glance over the allegations made in the F.I.R., piece of evidence and surrounding circumstances; it was also essential to examine, whether alleged offence had any nexus with the object of the case as contemplated under Ss.6, 7 & 8 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Whether act of accused was an “act of terrorism” or not, the motivation, object, design and purpose behind the said act, was to be examined; it was also to be seen as to whether said act had created a sense of fear and insecurity in the public, or in a section of public, or community or in any sect—Where action would result in striking terror on creating fear, panic, sensation, helplessness and sense of insecurity among the people in the particular area, it would amount to “terror”; and such an action squarely fell within the ambit of S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, and would be triable by a Special Court constituted for such purpose—Courts had only to see whether the “terrorist act” was such which would have the tendency to create sense of fear and insecurity in the minds of the people or any section of the society.

2015 PCrLJ 768 Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court

State VS SUFI ALI

153-A—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.8 & 9—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.417(2) & 196—Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009, Art.60—Promoting enmity between different groups, acts intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred and offences against the State—Procedure—Appeal against acquittal—Maintainability—Section 196, Cr.P.C., had elaborated that it was the domain of the Central Government or the Provincial Government or an officer empowered on their behalf to move a complaint for invocation of S.153-A, P.P.C.—Procedure specified in S.196, Cr.P.C., had to be strictly complied with and any defect in procedure was not curable—Such mandatorily expressed provision could not and should not be overlooked—Supreme Appellate Court observed that Legal Branch in Gilgit-Baltistan, should be well versed with such matters and all District Police Officers should be acquainted with the matters for which procedure had been laid down and steps to be taken—Findings of the Chief Court Gilgit-Baltistan, in the present case, whereby accused were acquitted from the charges, prosecution and Law Department should have gone through the clear cut orders of the court and realized their mistake, and having legal approach not to prefer an appeal in the Supreme Appellate Court, as the said order had no infirmities—Legal department, in the present case, should have consulted the Advocate General Gilgit-Baltistan, who was representing them; if they did not agree to his professional advice, then Law Department should depute one of its experts, and well versed officers to deal with the matter with their professional advice by performing such non-maintainable appeal against acquittal, revisions and reviews—Supreme Appellate Court further observed that findings of the Chief Court, in the present case, were not based on the merits and quality of evidence adduced, but on the mode adopted for prosecution of the individuals.

2014 GBLR 137 SUPREME-APPELLATE-COURT

State VS SUFI ALI

153-A—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.8, 9 & 25—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.196 & 417(2)—Promoting enmity between different groups, act of terrorism—Appeal against acquittal—Case was registered on information with the delay of almost 20 days—Procedure—Police Officer was duty bound to send report to the Magistrate concerned forthwith—Police Officer did not send any such report to the Magistrate, which had caused a serious doubt about the secret information and proceedings by the Police Officer—Case could not be registered with promptitude, which had made the case of prosecution doubtful—Prosecution witnesses had stated that they were never associated with the investigation of the case nor their statements under S.161, Cr.P.C., were ever recorded by the Investigating Officer—Inference could be drawn that witnesses had not seen accused persons while committing the offence—Whole exercise undertaken by the Investigator, while collecting the incriminating material from accused persons, was rendered futile—Such kind of evidence could not be relied upon for conviction and sentence, particularly, when appeal was against acquittal—Cognizance in the offence under S.153-A, P.P.C., could not be taken to any court in view of S.196, Cr.P.C.—Registration of FIR in such a manner was void ab initio—Offence under S.153-A, P.P.C., could not be termed as an offence against individual, rather it was an offence against the State—Court would take the cognizance of offence punishable under S.153-A, P.P.C., upon a complaint made by Federal Government or Provincial Government or some officer so empowered in that behalf by any of the two Governments—No sanction was accorded, entitling the Judge Anti-Terrorism Court to take the cognizance of the offence under S.153-A, P.P.C.—Case in an offence under S.153-A, P.P.C., could not be proceeded on the report prepared under S.173, Cr.P.C.—Non-adherence and observance of the provisions of S.196, Cr.P.C., rendered the subsequent proceedings a nullity—Where a condition for the exercise of jurisdiction, was not fulfilled, the whole proceedings, subsequent thereto would become coram non judice, and would have no legal effect, and would render the whole exercise, not only illegal, but also without jurisdiction—Accused was presumed to be innocent, unless found guilty—Supreme Appellate Court, could not substitute its own finding, unless it was found that the findings of the Chief Court, were based on mis-reading of the evidence leading to miscarriage of justice—Judgment of the Chief Court, whereby, accused persons were acquitted, was unexceptional, and did not require any interference, in circumstances.

2014 PCrLJ 1256 Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court

Syed NAWAZ HUSSAIN VS State

153-A—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 8 & 9—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.196—Promoting enmity between different groups, acts intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred—Prosecution for offences against the State—In view of the sensitivity of the offence under S.153-A, P.P.C. and S.8/9 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, same had been held in law to be an offence against the State, instead of an offence against an individual though the individuals also affect from commission of such nature of offences—Right of prosecution had been given to the State instead of an individual in the general interest of the people—S.H.O., or the informant in the case had lodged the First Information Report, who were not Central/Provincial Government, nor they were the persons duly authorized for the purpose as envisaged under S.196, Cr.P.C.—Proceedings carried out by the court on that report was coram non judice, ab initio void and nullity in the eyes of law—Accused were acquitted from the charges, in circumstances.

2013 MLD 1588 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

SHAHRUKH JATOI VS State

Ss. 23, 6, 7 & 8—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 354, 109, 216 & 34—Act of terrorism, qatl-e-amd, assault to woman with intent to outrage her modesty, abetment, harbouring offender and common intention—Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to the court of ordinary jurisdiction—Application for transfer of case of the accused was dismissed by the Special Court—Validity—Offence was committed on the road and by such act of the accused, young boy was shot dead by automatic weapon over petty matter—Act of accused was designed to create sense of fear and insecurity and helplessness in the minds of general public disturbing the tempo of the life and tranquility of the society and provisions of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, were attracted and impact of such act terrorized society at large by creating panic and fear in their minds—Presence of personal enmity would not exclude the jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court and neither motive nor intent for commission of offence was relevant for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on the Anti-Terrorism Court—Act of accused created sense of helplessness and insecurity amongst the people of area where offence was committed and did destabilize the public at large—Present case would fall within the jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court—Order of the Trial Court did not suffer from any material irregularity or illegality and the same was maintained.

2012 YLR 1938 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

ASRAR AHMED KHAN VS SPECIAL JUDGE, ANTI-TERRORISM COURT, FAISALABAD

Ss. 23, 6, 7 & 8—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.283/290/291/324/353/435/506/ 186/148/149—Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199—Obstruction in public way, public nuisance, nuisance after injunction to discontinue, attempt to commit Qatl-e-amd, assault or criminal force, mischief by fire or explosive substance, criminal intimidation, obstruction public servant in discharge of public functions, rioting with deadly weapon and unlawful assembly—Constitutional petition—Transfer of case to regular court—Anti-Terrorism Court vide impugned order had refused to transfer the case to regular court—Validity—Accused petitioner and other accused persons while armed with fire-arms had allegedly not only blocked a chowk, but had also made firing and pelted stones on police employees—Astonishingly, none of the police officials or any other member of the District Administration, present at the place of occurrence, had received a single injury—Investigating Officer could not collect any crime empty from the spot—Ten or eleven unknown persons mentioned by complainant as accused had not been brought as accused in the case till date—Sectarian hatred falling within the ambit of S.8(d)(i) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was not involved in the case of accused and only terrorist activity had been alleged against the persons mentioned in the crime report—Facts of the case in stricto sensu did not attract the provisions of any section of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, including S.6 thereof—Anti-Terrorism Court, therefore, was not justified in rejecting the application of accused moved under S.23 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, especially when while disposing of the bail petition of accused it had been observed that according to the Investigating Officer the case seemed to be doubtful—Impugned order was, consequently, set aside with the direction to Anti-Terrorism Court to transfer the case to ordinary court for its trial afresh—Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.

2012 PCrLJ 1735 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

SHEHZAD ASIF RAZA VS SPECIAL JUDGE ANTI-TERRORISM COURT

Ss. 6, 7 & 8—Act of terrorism, determination of—Essentials—In order to determine as to whether the offence would fall within the ambit of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it is essential to look into the allegations levelled in the F.I.R., the record of the case and the surrounding circumstances—Court was also to examine that the ingredients of the alleged offence had nexus with the object of the case as contemplated under Ss.6, 7 and 8 of the said Act—Motivation, object, design and purpose behind the act are also to be seen for determining its nature of terrorism, besides having been created by it a sense of insecurity in the public.

2012 PCrLJ 1342 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

BAKSHOO VS State

Ss. 6, 7 & 8—“Terrorism”—Essential ingredients—In order to determine as to whether an offence would fall within the ambit under S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it would be essential to have a glance over the allegations made in the F.I.R., record of the case and surrounding circumstances; it was also necessary to examine whether the ingredients of alleged offence had any nexus with the object of the case as contemplated under Ss.6, 7 & 8, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Whether a particular act was an act of terrorism or not, the motivation, object, design or purpose behind said act, and whether the said act had created a sense of fear and insecurity in the public, or any section of public or community or in any sect was to be seen—Striking of terror was sine qua non for the application of the provisions as contained in S.6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which could not be determined without examining the nature, gravity and heinousness of the alleged offence.

2011 YLR 19 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

TARIQ HAKIM VS State

Ss. 6, 7 & 8—Determination as to whether an offence falls within the ambit of S.6, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Guide lines—Motive and object both make a path for guideance in order to determine whether the offence falls within the domain of Anti-Terrorism Act or not—Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 reflects two words, namely, “designed to” and “action” and from the interpretation of both these words one can draw an inference that whether the offence falls within the ambit of terrorism or not—Intention of the Legislature is very much clear from the words “designed to” and “action” and both the words have great impact on each other in order to constitute an action as act of terrorism—From the meaning of simple word “action” it is very different to deduct that the action of a person was an act of terrorism without the word “designed to” which means object behind the action—If the brutality of the act of a person is declared terrorism, then every murder case will fall within the definition of terrorism, as seen from any angle the murder is always committed in a brutal manner—Definition of terrorism, thus, is incomplete without the words, “designed to” which means the object, motive or purpose behind the act and not the consequential effect created by such act.

2009 PLD 11 SUPREME-COURT

BASHIR AHMED VS MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE

Ss. 6, 7 & 8—Determination as to whether an offence falls within the ambit of S.6, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Essentials.

2007 PLD 444 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

ABDUL SATTAR VS AMIR MUHAMMAD KHAN

—Ss. 6, 7 & 8—Jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court, determination of—While deciding the question of jurisdiction it would be necessary to examine that the ingredients of the alleged occurrence have any nexus with the object of the Anti-Terrorism Act

2006 PLD 377 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

SHAFIQUE AHMED alias SHAHJEE VS State

—S. 8—Method provided to nullify the delaying tactics of the accused or his counsel—When on two consecutive dates the Advocate for the accused does not appear in Court, then a Counsel at State expense can be appointed to proceed with the case—Howe

2005 PCRLJ 1442 QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTAN

State VS Jamadar MUHAMMAD KHAN

—Preamble, Ss.6, 7 & 8—Object and purpose of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Object to promulgate Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was to control the acts of terrorism, Sectarian violence and other heinous offences as defined in S.6 of the said Act and their

2005 PLD 57 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT

Haji ABDUL HAKEEM VS JUDGE SPECIAL COURT ANTI-TERRORISM, D. I. Khan

–Ss. 6, 7, 8 & 23—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302/34—Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199—Constitutional petition—Anti Terrorism Act, 1997, applicability of—Transfer of case from Anti-Terrorism Court to ordinary Court—Anti-Terrorism Act,

2005 YLR 2483 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT

Mian MUHAMMAD GHAFOOR VS State

—Ss.302 & 34—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6, 7(a) & 8— Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199— Constitutional petition—Quashing of order and transfer of case to the Court of normal criminal jurisdiction—Petitioner/accused had praye

2005 PLD 344 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

AMIR KHAN VS State

–Ss. 6, 7 & 8—Act of terrorism—In order to make an act punishable under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it must be shown that it bears nexus with Ss.6, 7 & 8 of the said Act.

2004 PLD 917 SUPREME-COURT

MUHAMMAD FAROOQ VS IBRAR

—-Ss: 6, 7 & 8—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302/324/148/149–Object of promulgation of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—To bring an offence within the ambit of the Act, it is essential to examine that the said offence should have nexus with the object of t

2004 PCRLJ 121 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

AMIR ZAMAN VS Syed AMER ABBAS

—-S. 417(2-A)— Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6, 7, 8 & 25(4)—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.302/341/342/353/365/365-A/392/394/412/34—West Pakistan Arms Ordinance (XX of 1965), S.13–Appeal against acquittal and revision for enhancement of s

2004 MLD 152 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

THE STATE VS NAWAB KHAN SARHADI

—-Ss.8(d) & 25—Appeal against acquittal—Allegation against accused was that after their search, audio cassettes and books were secured from each of them which contained abusive and insulting material to certain sect of Islam and by such material sec

2003 PLD 704 SUPREME-COURT

Sh. MUHAMMAD AMJAD VS THE STATE

—-Ss. 302(a) & 365-A—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.2-.B, 6(b), 7 & 8—Condition precedent for applicability of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.

2003 MLD 1401 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

TAHIR HUSSAIN VS KHALIQ DAR

—-Ss.6, 7 & 8—Compounding of scheduled offence—Cases triable by Courts under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 must have nexus with Ss.6, 7 & 8 of the said Act—Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 being a Special Law, private complainant or legal heirs of deceased had

2003 YLR 1977 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

AHMED SHAH VS THE STATE

—-Ss.6, 7, 8 & Sched.—Jurisdiction of AntiÂ-Terrorism Courts—Where offences mentioned in the Schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had nexus with the object mentioned in Ss.6, 7 & 8 of said Act—Anti-Terrorism Courts would have jurisdiction to try

2003 PCRLJ 216 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

THE STATE VS MUHAMMAD UMAR alias CHOTOO

——Ss. 302/324—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.6, 7, 8, 19(10) & 25(4)—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss.417, 439 & 561-A—Acquittal of accused tried in absentia—Validity—Prosecution itself had prayed Anti-Terrorism Court to try a

2002 SCMR 1562 SUPREME-COURT

AHMAD OMAR SAEED SHAIKH VS THE STATE

—-S. 526—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.7, 8, 11 & 28—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.365-A/302/109—Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)—Transfer of case from one District to another—Validity—High Court, in view of S. 526, Cr.P.

2002 YLR 200 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

MUHAMMAD RAMZAN VS SUPERINTENDENT, NEW CENTRAL JAIL, MULTAN

—-Ss. 6, 7 & 8—Constitution of Pakistan (1973), An. 199—Constitutional petition Permissible remissions grant of accused in his petition had sought direction: against Authorities to include the remission granted from time to time since after the dare

2002 PCRLJ 1765 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

GOVERNMENT OF SINDH VS FARAD NASEEM

—-S. 548—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.365-A, 368, 302, 109. 201, 120-A/34 & 29—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.7 & 8–General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S.3(16)—Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 2(1)(b)(c) & 164—Constitution of Pakistan

2002 PCRLJ 1317 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

Shaikh MUHAMMAD AMJAD VS THE STATE

—-Ss. 6, 7 & 8—Jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court—Scope—Anti-Terrorism Court established under Anti/Terrorism Act, 1997, shall have the jurisdiction to try an offence if it is a scheduled offence and has nexus with Ss.6, 7 & 8 of the said Act.

2001 PLD 521 SUPREME-COURT

BASHIR AHMAD VS NAVEED IQBAL

Ss. 6, 7 & 8—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302—Act of terrorism/terrorist act—Death by sprinkling of spirit—Occurrence took place within boundary walls of house of victim—Case was transferred by Anti-ÂTerrorism Court to the Court of ordinary jurisdiction—High Court refused to interfere with the order of transfer—Validity—Alleged sprinkling of the spirit on the person -of the victim was within the boundary walls of the complainant’s house—Where the offence committed was not in public, the element of a striking terror or creating sense of fear and insecurity in the people, o: any section of the people was not made discernible in the F.I.R and for that matter on the record of the case as a whole—Offences mentioned in the Schedule should have nexus with the object of. the Act and the offences covered by sections 6, 7 and 8 thereof—Heinousness

2001 PCRLJ 1823 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

HABIB SAIN VS THE STATE

—-S. 497—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.295-A & 295-B—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.8/9—Ball—Witnesses in their statements made under S.161, Cr.P.C. had made only allegations of general nature against the accused and did not say anything

2001 PCRLJ 581 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

NOOR KHAN VS JUDGE, SPECIAL COURT, ANTI-TERRORISM, SARGODHA DIVISION, SARGODHA

—-Ss. 302/34—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss.23, 6, 7 & 8–Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199—Constitutional petition—Transfer of case to regular Court—Case related to murder due to the previous murder enmity and the deceased, a pub

1999 YLR 643 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE

HARIS ABDULLAH VS STATE

—-Ss.10(4) & 11—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss.337-J & 365-A—Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII. of 1997), Ss.6, 7, 8 & 12–Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199–Constitutional petition—Transfer of case from Special Court to Criminal Court–Accused had s

1999 YLR 2620 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH

ASIF ALI ZARDARI VS STATE

—-Ss. 6, 7, 8 & 23—Transfer of case—For declaring an offence to be a scheduled offence and in line with the object of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, it was to be seen that the offence mentioned in the Sched. had any nexus with the very object of the

1998 SCMR 1156 SUPREME-COURT

MEHRAM ALI VS FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN

—-Sched. & Ss.6, 7 & 8—Terrorist act—Punishment for terrorist act–Prohibition of acts intended or likely to stir up sectarian hatred—Offences mentioned in the Sched. to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 should have nexus with the objects mentioned in