Section 18 : Misrepresentation
2023 MLD 1911 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
HASTAM ASHRAF MANN VS MUHAMMAD MOHSIN
Ss. 17 & 18—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 12(2)—Application under S. 12(2), C.P.C.—Fraud and misrepresentation, meanings of—Words “fraud”, “misrepresentation” and “want of jurisdiction” have not been defined in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908,—It is appropriate to borrow plain meanings of ‘fraud’ and ‘misrepresentation’ from the dictionary as well as from Ss. 17 & 18 of the Contract Act.
2023 PLD 17 ISLAMABAD
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES HOUSING FOUNDATION VS EJAZ AHMED KHAN
Ss.42 & 54—Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 18(1)—Suit for declaration and injunction—Allotment of plot—Misrepresentation—Vicarious liability, principle of—Negligence of employee of company—Effect—Plaintiff was transferee of suit plot which was in the management defendant Foundation—Plaintiff sold suit plot to another person but defendant Foundation few years after the transfer made by plaintiff, cancelled his allotment on the plea that it was made by fraud—Suit filed by plaintiff was dismissed by Trial Court—Validity—Defendant Foundation was vicariously responsible for loss occasioned by negligence of its employees—Barring some exceptions, such was the doctrine of vicarious liability having a good commercial rationale—Defendant Foundation was a company that charged transfer fee and had issued a document of title—Defendant Foundation held out to the world at large that its document of title was one on the basis of which title holder could transact the plot—Result would be monstrous, if defendant Foundation could turn around and disclaim its title document as bereft of any credence—Provisions of S. 18(1) of Contract Act, 1872, enumerated ingredients of misrepresentation which made actual knowledge of person making representation of it being untrue, irrelevant—Even if defendant Foundation as a corporate body did not know at the relevant time that transfer letter in question was not genuine, its employees per inquiry report knew so and their acts were vicariously attributable to defendant Foundation—Plaintiff carried out his due diligence of plot files at defendant Foundation’s office—Plaintiff was entitled to rely on transfer letter regarding title document issued by defendant Foundation to his predecessor-in-interest—Defendant Foundation was entitled to cancel the plot once it had found out that transfer letter was issued as a result of what the defendant Foundation called a fraud in which its employees were complicit with fake persons or such was an instance of gross negligence—Defendant Foundation was vicariously liable for negligence act of its employees, per its inquiry report, and was liable to compensate plaintiff—High Court set aside judgment and decree passed by Trial Court—Appeal was allowed accordingly.
2016 PLD 199 SUPREME-COURT
PAKISTAN RAILWAYS through AGM(Trafic), Lahore VS FOUR BROTHERS INTERNATIONAL (PVT) LTD
2(e) & Chap. II [Ss.10 to 30-C]—Agreement, rescission of—Agreement between the parties had the status of a statute and unless it was shown that any term of the agreement was violative of the law, it could not be rescinded by a party.
2016 YLR 188 QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTAN
ABDUL ZAHIR VS KHUDA-E-DAD
Ss. 8, 39, 42 & 54—-Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 129 (g)—West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S. 52—Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 91—Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 17 & 18—Suit for declaration, possession, cancellation and permanent injunction—Maintainability— Limitation— Mutation challenged on ground of fraud and misrepresentation—Proof—Presumption in favour of entries in record-of-rights and periodical records—Court may presume existence of certain facts—Plaintiff filed suit for declaration and permanent injunction claiming separation of his share through demarcation of suit property on ground that he had purchased suit property from joint Khata from predecessor of defendants by way of mutation entry—Defendants also filed suit for declaration, cancellation of the mutation entry in favour of plaintiff, possession and permanent injunction claiming that plaintiff, with connivance of revenue authorities, had got suit property mutated in his favour—Trial Court decreed the suit of plaintiff and dismissed the one filed by defendants—Appellate court reversed findings of Trial Court and decreed suit of defendants—Both parties raised objection of limitation—Validity—Plaintiff had first filed application for demarcation of suit property before Revenue hierarchy, which fact had not been disputed by defendants—Plaintiff, having purchased suit property from predecessor of defendants, had stepped into his shoes and become co-sharer—Limitation for demarcation of suit property arose when right of plaintiffs had been declined by defendants—Plaintiff’s suit was, therefore, within limitation—Limitation for cancellation of the mutation entry was three years under Art. 91 of Limitation Act, 1908—Mutation of inheritance recorded in favour of defendants had reflected that they were aware of the mutation entry in favour of plaintiff before filing of present suit—Defendants, in their pleadings, had not mentioned date when they had come to know about mutation entry in question—Suit filed by defendants for cancellation of the mutation entry was, therefore, barred by limitation—Appellate court had decided question of limitation on wrong premise—Plaintiff, being joint recorded owner of suit property, had every right to seek relief from competent court pertaining to his right arising out of mutation entry—Impugned mutation entry had never been challenged by predecessor of defendants during his life time—Defendants, both in their written statement and suit subsequently filed by them, had initially challenged mutation entry in question on ground of fraud and misrepresentation, but they later had withdrawn said ground by filing application for amendment of their pleadings—Defendants had challenged the mutation entry also on ground that the mutation was neither signed nor attested by witness mentioned in list of witnesses, but subsequently, they had abandoned said witnesses by filing an application to that effect—Best evidence, which could be produced by defendants, had not been produced and the same had been intentionally withheld, for which adverse inference was to be taken against them under Art. 129 (g), Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984—Presumption of truth was attached to revenue record in terms of S. 52 of West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, which was rebuttable—Defendants had not elaborated alleged forgery and misrepresentation either in their pleadings or through evidence—Defendants had not led any evidence to prove that the entry in revenue record was collusive and fraudulent—Defendants failed to rebut presumption of truth attached to the mutation entry—Entries in favour of plaintiff appeared in Jamabandi, which was strong evidence in his support and required rebuttal—Mere verbal assertions made by defendants could not be taken as rebuttal to the mutation entry in favour of plaintiff—High Court, setting aside impugned judgments and decrees of appellate court, maintained decision of Trial Court—Revision petition filed by plaintiff was allowed, while the other filed by defendants dismissed.
2012 CLD 1192 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LTD. VS KHAIRPUR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED
9—Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 18, 19 & 21—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.152 & O.XXIII, R.3—Recovery of bank loan— Compromise decree, modification of— Illegality and misrepresentation—Voidable agreement— Determination— Defendant’s challenge was directed towards compromise agreement on the ground that it was tainted by illegalities amounting to misrepresentations and hence liable to be modified—Validity—Remedy sought, i.e. relief under S.152, C.P.C., was only available against decree—Compromise decree and agreement were not the same thing—Relief under S.152, C.P.C. was available in respect of a compromise decree without compromise agreement being impugned at all—Correction of compromise decree was not the same thing as modification of compromise agreement—Power to “correct” decree did not confer any power to modify agreement, as the two matters were separate and distinct and must be so dealt with—None of the provisions of Ss.18 and 19 of Contract Act, 1872, invoked by defendant were applicable—High Court declined to modify decree passed earlier on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties—Application was dismissed in circumstances.
2012 CLD 1192 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LTD. VS KHAIRPUR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED
Ss. 18 & 19—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.2(2), 12(2) & O. XXIII, R. 3— Compromise decree and agreement—Distinguished—Setting aside of compromise decree and agreement— Principles— Compromise agreement is made by parties and compromise decree by Court—If agreement is successfully impugned then decree almost always fails, but it may be possible to attack the decree without impugning the agreement—Challenge to one is, therefore, not necessarily a challenge to the other—Grounds on which the agreement on one hand and the decree on the other can be attacked may overlap but are nonetheless distinct, it may be that as a matter of form, the challenge is directed towards the decree—Substance of challenge has to be carefully ascertained and distinction between decree and agreement must be kept in mind— If a compromised matter is challenged on the ground of misrepresentation, it is important to be clear, whether attack is directed against agreement or decree—Compromise agreement is simply a contract and can be impugned on the ground of misrepresentation, if matter comes within the ambit of Ss.18 and 19 of Contract Act, 1872, and compromise decree, on the other hand, can be set aside under S.12(2), C.P.C.
2012 CLD 1136 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LTD. VS KHAIRPUR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED
9—Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss..18, 19 & 21—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIII, R.3 & S.152— Recovery of bank loan—Compromise decree, modification of— Illegality and misrepresentation— Voidable agreement—Determination—Defendant’s challenge was directed towards compromise agreement on the ground that it was tainted by illegalities amounting to misrepresentations and hence liable to be modified—Validity—Remedy sought, i.e. relief under S.152, C.P.C., was only available against decree—Compromise decree and agreement were not the same thing—Relief under S.152, C.P.C. was available in respect of a compromise decree without compromise agreement being impugned at all—Correction of compromise decree was not the same thing as modification of compromise agreement—Power to “correct” decree did not confer any power to modify agreement, as the two matters were separate and distinct and must be so dealt with—None of the provisions of Ss.18 and 19 of Contract Act, 1872, invoked by defendant were applicable—High Court declined to modify decree passed earlier on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties–Application was dismissed in circumstances.
2012 CLD 1136 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LTD. VS KHAIRPUR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED
Ss. 18 & 19—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXIII, R.3, Ss.2(2) & 12 (2)— Compromise decree and agreement—Distinguished—Setting aside of compromise decree and agreement—Principles—Compromise agreement is made by parties and compromise decree by court—If agreement is successfully impugned then decree almost always fails, but it may be possible to attack the decree without impugning the agreement—Challenge to one is, therefore, not necessarily a challenge to the other—Grounds on which the agreement on one hand and the decree on the other can be attacked may overlap but are nonetheless distinct; it may be that as a matter of form, the challenge is directed towards the decree—Substance of challenge has to be carefully ascertained and distinction between decree and agreement must be kept in mind—If a compromised matter is challenged on the ground of misrepresentation, it is important to be clear, whether attack is directed against agreement or decree–Compromise agreement is simply a contract and can be impugned on the ground of misrepresentation, if matter comes within the ambit of Ss. 18 and 19 of Contract Act, 1872, and compromise decree, on the other hand, can be set aside under S.12(2), C.P.C.
2012 PLD 324 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LTD. VS KHAIRPUR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED
9—Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 18, 19 & 21—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.152 & O.XXIII, R.3—Recovery of bank loan—Compromise decree, modification of—Illegality and misrepresentation–Voidable agreement—Determination—Defendant’s challenge was directed towards compromise agreement on the ground that it was tainted by illegalities amounting to misrepresentations and hence liable to be modified—Validity—Remedy sought, i.e. relief under S.152, C.P.C., was only available against decree—Compromise decree and agreement were not the same thing—Relief under S.152, C.P.C. was available in respect of a compromise decree without compromise agreement being impugned at all—Correction of compromise decree was not the same thing as modification of compromise agreement—Power to “correct” decree did not confer any power to modify agreement, as the two matters were separate and distinct and must be so dealt with—None of the provisions of Ss.18 and 19 of Contract Act, 1872, invoked by defendant were applicable—High Court declined to modify decree passed earlier on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties—Application was dismissed in circumstances.
2012 PLD 324 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL CREDIT AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION LTD. VS KHAIRPUR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED
Ss. 18 & 19—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss.2(2), 12(2) & O.XXIII, R.3—Compromise decree and agreement—Distinguished—Setting aside of compromise decree and agreement—Principles—Compromise agreement is made by parties and compromise decree by Court—If agreement is successfully impugned then decree almost always fails, but it may be possible to attack the decree without impugning the agreement—Challenge to one is, therefore, not necessarily a challenge to the other—Grounds on which the agreement on one hand and the decree on the other can be attacked may overlap but are nonetheless distinct, it may be that as a matter of form, the challenge is directed towards the decree—Substance of challenge has to be carefully ascertained and distinction between decree and agreement must be kept in mind—If a compromised matter is challenged on the ground of misrepresentation, it is important to be clear, whether attack is directed against agreement or decree—Compromise agreement is simply a contract and can be impugned on the ground of misrepresentation, if matter comes within the ambit of Ss.18 and 19 of Contract Act, 1872, and compromise decree, on the other hand, can be set aside under S.12(2), C.P.C.
2011 PLD 44 SUPREME-COURT
PAKCOM LIMITED VS FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN
Ss. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21 & 22—“Coercion”, “undue influence “, “fraud”, “misrepresentation”, “mistake”-Scope-“Consent”-Ingredients-Where all the terms and conditions enumerated in the contract have been accepted by the parties freely and at their own, contract does not fall within the ambit of “coercion” as defined in S.15 or “undue influence” as defined in S.16 or “fraud” as defined in S.17 or “misrepresentation” as defined in S.18 or “mistake” as enshrined in Ss.20, 21, 22 of the Contract Act, 1872—All agreements or contracts are made by the free consent of parties—“Consent” is said to be free as provided under S.14 of the Act, when it is not caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation and mistake subject to the provisions of Ss.20, 21 & 22 of Contract Act, 1872—Principles.
2008 SCMR 1182 SUPREME-COURT
Mst FATEH BIBI VS MUHAMMAD SAEED
42—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.54—Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.17, 18 & 25—Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art.120—Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.185(3)—Suit for declaration—Sale deed executed by plaintiff in favour of defendants including her mother—Plaintiff after more than 15 years challenged validity of sale deed on ground of fraud, misrepresentation and without consideration—Proof—Plaintiff’s own brother was available in transaction along with her husband and one of the vendees to the extent of 1/3rd share was her own real mother—If any fraud was intended to be committed, mother should not at all have been shown as a vendee and her real brother as marginal witness to sale deed—Had plaintiff not entered into valid transaction, she would not have slept over matter for such a long period—Suit was hopelessly time-barred—Plaintiff infact had sold suit property for consideration and no fraud or misrepresentation had taken place—Suit was dismissed in circumstances.
2006 SCMR 930 SUPREME-COURT
FATEH KHAN (deceased) through L.Rs. and another VS SURRIYA BEGUM
–Ss. 39 & 42—Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.4, 18, 25 & 214—Registration Act (XVI of 1908), S.60—General power of attorney by an illiterate Pardanashin lady for Court case allegedly containing power in favour of attorney to sell her property—Sale
2003 CLD 1 SUPREME-COURT
SHIPYARD K. DAMEN INTERNATIONAL VS KARACHI SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS LTD.
—-Ss.126, 127, 10, 17 & 18—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2—Bank guarantee and letter of credit—Nature and effect—Rights and liabilities of surety/Bank, principal debtor and creditor under Bank guarantee and principal contra
2003 PLD 191 SUPREME-COURT
SHIPYARD K. DAMEN INTERNATIONAL VS KARACHI SHIPYARD AND ENGINEERING WORKS LTD.
—Ss. 126, 127, 10, 17 & 18—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXXIX, Rr. 1 & 2—Bank guarantee and letter of credit– -Nature and effect—Rights and liabilities of surety/Bank, principal debtor and creditor tinder Bank guarantee and principal contr
2003 YLR 1523 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, QUAID-E-AZAM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, KARACHI VS AER RAINTA INTERNATIONAL PAKISTAN (PVT.) LTD., KARACHI
—-Ss. 18 & 19—Contract procured by any representation, which is not correct, though innocent and unintentional and honestly believed to be correct is said to have been procured by misrepresentation in terms of S.18, Contract Act, 1872—Where one coul
1997 SCMR 1456 SUPREME-COURT
ALLAH JOWAI VS WALI DAD
—-Ss. 17 & 18—Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)—Transaction of sale by plaintiff (lady)—Plaintiff challenged sale on ground of fraud and misrepresentation—Trial Court found that plaintiff was assisted by her son at registration of sal
1994 MLD 1612 LAHORE-HIGH-COURT-LAHORE
ZAFAR AHMAD VS GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
Contract Act 1872 —-R.18(3)—Any representation, which is not correct, though innocent and not intentional would amount to misrepresentation.
1990 MLD 2329 QUETTA-HIGH-COURT-BALOCHISTAN
ZAFAR IQBAL VS INSPECTOR-GENERAL, FRONTIER CORPS, BALOCHISTAN
—-Ss. 17 & 18—Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art.199—Onus to prove pleas of fraud, misrepresentation etc.—Petitioners having merely alleged mala fides, fraud and misrepresentation on the part of respondents onus was entirely upon them to prove s
1989 CLC 2117 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
MERCANTILE FIRE & GENERAL INSURANCE CO. OF PAKISTAN VS IMAM & IMAM LTD.
Ss 17 & 18–Fraud and misrepresentation–Meaning, scope and import of-Difference between fraud and misrepresentation is one of intent though the effect of either may be the same viz. obtaining of an advantage which, but for the facts alleged, may not have been obtainable.
1983 CLC 1117 KARACHI-HIGH-COURT-SINDH
BAKHTAN BIBI VS PAKISTAFT GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.
18-Misrepresentation of fact-Insured stating to have produced all relevant papers including registration book of car in name of former owner and mortgage deed before relevant officers of Insurance Company alongwith proposal form-Insured further stating that during currency of insurance policy, Insurance Company on perusal of such documents paid compensation to insured for two other claims -Held, such facts lead to conclusion that insured made all facts known to Insurance Company and Insurance Company indicated declaration contrary to facts stated in registration book and issued insurance policy causing risk mentioned in policy.
1966 PLD 121 PESHAWAR-HIGH-COURT
ABDUR REHMAN VS KHALILUR REHMAN AND OTHERS
Gift – Right of revocation dies with donor-Suit for revocation-Donor’s death during pendency of suit or appeal Legal representatives not entitled to continue proceedings-Suit not for revocation (rijaa) but for cancellation (tansikh) of gift deed stands on different footing-Such suit not only competent but right to sue survives after death of plaintiff donor-Specific Relief Act (1 of 1877), S. 39 read with Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss. 15, 16, 17 & 18.